



# CONNEKT POLICY BRIEF

N.1 September/2022

## Policy Brief on Macro-Level Drivers of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in MENA and Balkans

### 01 INTRODUCTION

Despite latter attention given to the legal instruments designed to tackle radicalisation and violent extremism (VE), current policies on preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) draw upon security approaches and an overemphasis on religion as a driver; prescribe young people as passive victims of any external influence or indoctrination and mainly focus on the association between individual trajectories and radicalisation. The identification of these elements as explanatory factors driving VE, besides presenting limited evidence, contributes to the stigmatisation of certain communities as shelters for radicals and potential terrorists. Such assumptions disregard the premise that it is the combination of several drivers in a determinate setting which can further explain what encourages citizens to engage in violence.

This policy brief is based on empirical research carried out in Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo and Bulgaria. Both this paper and previous research have been conducted within the framework of the EU-funded H2020 Project CONNEKT (CONtexts of extremism iN mEna and balkan socieTies).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Website of the CONNEKT project: <https://h2020connekt.eu/>



## 02

## CONNEKT'S MAIN FINDINGS

## 2.1. APPROACHING THE RESEARCH ON RADICALISATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

- Radicalisation and Violent Extremist expressions have been assumed in a reactive manner.
- Religion and identity have been at the core of the approach, with a prevailing institutional emphasis on Islamic-driven extremism.
- Recent models of radicalisation analysis have moved away from a linear approach to a multi-factorial and contextual approach. Distinguishing between sympathy for VE and involvement in its production.
- Prevention has traditionally been more focused on detection or identification of potential violent extremists than on preventive long-term measures.
- Having a strong security approach, prevention strategies have been criticised for their stigmatising potential over certain communities considered as a “vulnerable group” at risk of “radicalisation”.

## 2

## CONNEKT'S CONCEPTUAL APPROACH

Radicalisation is understood as “the process of developing extremist ideologies and beliefs. Violent extremism is construed as “ideologies that oppose a society’s core values and principles”.<sup>2</sup>

CONNEKT frames these definitions within the context of social collective dynamics.

Prevention understood as “the efforts to influence individual and/or environmental factors that are suggested to create the conditions in which VE can and cannot flourish, using social or educational rather than explicitly security-driven measures.”<sup>3</sup> Considering that radicalisation and VE are the result of social processes, the intervention of other social areas outside the field of coercion is required.<sup>4 5</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Borum, R. (2012). Radicalisation into Violent Extremism. *Journal of Strategic Security Studies* 4:4.

<sup>3</sup> Stephens, W., Sieckelink, S. and Boutellier, H. (2019). 'Preventing Violent Extremism: A Review of the Literature'. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, pp. 1-16. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1543144>

<sup>4</sup> Nünlist, C. and Frazer, O. (2015). 'The Concept of Countering Violent Extremism.' *CSS Analyses in Security Policy*, 183. Available at: <https://css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/CSSAnalyse183-EN.pdf>


<sup>5</sup> Schinkel, W. (2011). 'Prepression: The actuarial archive and new technologies of security.' *Theoretical Criminology*, 15(4), pp. 365-380. Available at: <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1362480610395366>

2.2. MAPPING THE DRIVERS AT THE MACRO LEVEL

- Not a single combination of factors leading to radicalisation can be stated, as it responds to the context, the time conjuncture and the specific individual paths of each subject. The “relative deprivation theory”<sup>6 7 8</sup> argues that it is not the factor as such, but rather the gap between personal expectations and the impossibility of achieving own goals, or the perception that such ambitions are unfeasible, what leads to participation in violence.
- CONNEKT has pre-identified seven potential drivers that have been under analysis in the macro-level empirical research: religion, economic deprivation, territorial inequalities, transnational dynamics, digital socialisation, political issues (ideas and grievances), education, culture and leisure opportunities.
- An excessive emphasis on **religion** prevails in both regions. In those cases where the implication of religion is obvious, it comes accompanied by other factors. Extremist discourses of religious nature have much more repercussion in marginalized areas, where the state does not reach the population, and when interspersed with personal financial status.
- Both in the Balkans and in the MENA region there has been a shift in the perception of religion, that is not only considered as a driver of radicalisation, but also as a **de-radicalisation tool or resilience factor**.

3

FIGURE 1. Shift over the predominance of religion as a driver



- Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia have adopted a strategy of dissemination of anti-extremist religious discourse. In the Balkans, regional religious institutions have gained an

<sup>6</sup> Runciman, W. G. (1966). *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice: A study of attitudes to social inequality in twentieth century England*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul

<sup>7</sup> Gurr, T.R. (1970). *Why Men Rebel* (Center for International Studies, Princeton University), New Jersey: Princeton University Press

<sup>8</sup> Wieviorka, M. (1981) *Sociétés et terrorisme*. Paris: Fayard

increased role in P/CVE agendas, while the rise of **violent far-right extremism**, which tends to be left out of the analysis of VE, **is being acknowledged**.<sup>9</sup>

- There is **no clear connection between economic deprivation and VE**. Poverty is acknowledged as an indirect trigger, working in combination with other drivers. It is not economic deprivation itself, but rather the possibilities of reaching an economic stability conditioned to political opportunity structures, which enhances youth frustration and potential intervention in violence.<sup>10</sup>
- **Territorial inequalities:** In the Balkans, there has been a **transfer of the areas where radicalisation occurs** from the rural to the urban environment, although it is not clear whether the most prone areas to the phenomenon are mono-ethnic or multi-ethnic.<sup>11</sup> In the MENA region, economic situation is related to territorial division.<sup>12</sup> **Communities with no access to social services, and highly securitised are more susceptible to radicalisation and VE.**
- **Transnational dynamics:** The emergence of VE is **linked to ongoing crises in which transnational dynamics have a strong role**. The penetration of **external ideologies, the influence of the diaspora and especially the controversial issue of the management of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) mark the border and security agenda** of the countries studied. In the Balkans region, citizens do not just join the ranks of fighters in Syria and Iraq, but affiliate as well to other formations such as “The Kosovo Front” in Ukrainian separatist territories.<sup>13</sup> In the MENA region, Morocco appears to be the only country analysed by CONNEKT that has sought to put in place a comprehensive programme that goes beyond criminal measures: the Moussalaha (Reconciliation), aimed at de-radicalising jihadists.<sup>14</sup>
- **Digital socialisation:** It is considered a critical driver in both regions **particularly linked to transnational dynamics**. Social media and the digital environment have become a platform for narratives retransmission. In the Balkans, and except for the Republic of Kosovo, which has a Muslim population considerably larger than the rest of its neighboring countries, these campaigns adopt an ultra-nationalist vision with

<sup>9</sup> Georgieva, L., Trajanovski, N., and Kambovski, V. (2021). 'Macro approaches to the study of radicalisation and violent extremism: a view from the MENA region'. Available at: <https://h2020connekt.eu/publications/balkans-macro-approaches-to-the-study-of-radicalisation-and-violent-extremism/>

<sup>10</sup> Torrekens, C., & de Le Vingne, D. (2020). 'Concepts and Analytical Framework Debating Notions and Approaches to Radicalisation and Violent Extremism.' Available at: <https://h2020connekt.eu/publications/concepts-and-analytical-framework-debating-notions-and-approaches-to-radicalisation-and-violent-extremism/>

<sup>11</sup> Georgieva, L., Trajanovski, N., and Kambovski, V. (2021). *Op. Cit.*

<sup>12</sup> Mouna, K., and Er-rifaï, A. (2021). 'Macro approaches to the study of radicalisation and violent extremism: a view from the MENA region'. Available at: [https://h2020connekt.eu/publications/mena\\_macro\\_approaches\\_to\\_the\\_study\\_of\\_radicalisation\\_and\\_violent\\_extremism/](https://h2020connekt.eu/publications/mena_macro_approaches_to_the_study_of_radicalisation_and_violent_extremism/)

<sup>13</sup> Atlantic Initiative (2018). 'Countering Violent Extremism Baseline Program: Research Findings – Bosnia & Herzegovina.' Sarajevo: Atlantic Initiative. Available at: <https://atlantskainicijativa.org/wp30>

<sup>14</sup> Chirchi, T., and Jrad, E. (2021). 'Regional perspectives on radicalisation and violent extremism.' Available at: <https://h2020connekt.eu/publications/radicalisation-and-violent-extremism-in-the-mena>

conservative content.<sup>15 16 17 18</sup> In the MENA region, messages respond to distorted and radical interpretations of Islam.<sup>19</sup> The absence of alternative narratives, the proliferation of disinformation campaigns and poor cybersecurity structures increase the possibilities of reaching violent rhetoric online.<sup>20</sup> The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the incidence of all group's online activity.

TABLE 1. Strategies regarding FTFs

	STRATEGY FOR RETURNEES
<b>BALKANS</b>	
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)</b>	Few repatriations. Development of strategies for social re-integration of returnees by the Ilmiyyah Association of the Islamic Community.
<b>Bulgaria</b>	The Strategy for Countering Radicalisation and Terrorism (2015-2020) recognises the need for de-radicalisation programmes but lacks concrete actions.
<b>North Macedonia</b>	Long prison sentences for returnees and absence of re-socialisation programmes. The Islamic Community of Macedonia (ICM) has a strategy to facilitate the reintegration of foreign fighters, but the project lacks funding.
<b>Kosovo</b>	Prevention of departures, repatriation of citizens in conflict zones and rehabilitation and reintegration through de-radicalisation programmes.
<b>MENA</b>	
<b>Morocco</b>	Moussalaha (reconciliation): comprehensive programme focused on de-radicalisation.
<b>Tunisia</b>	Limited repatriation efforts and absence of comprehensive reintegration programmes.
<b>Jordan</b>	Permission to return, but repatriation is not included in its national strategy. Absence of reintegration strategies.

<sup>15</sup> Demjaha, A., and Peci, L. (2020). 'Kosovo: Country report on national approaches to extremism.' Available at: <https://h2020connekt.eu/publications/kosovo-country-report-on-national-approaches-to-extremism>

<sup>16</sup> Dudić, A., Hirkić, M., Turčalo, S., Bašić, S., Bakić, S. and Kapidžić, D. (2021). 'Bosnia and Herzegovina: drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism in the light of state dynamics in MENA and the Balkans.' Available at: <https://h2020connekt.eu/publications/mapping-the-drivers-of-radicalisation-in-the-light-of-state-dynamics-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina>

<sup>17</sup> Dzhokova, R. (2020). 'Bulgaria: Country report on national approaches to extremism.' Available at: <https://h2020connekt.eu/publications/bulgaria-country-report-on-national-approaches-to-extremism>


<sup>18</sup> Baker, C. (2021). 'Extremism and Violent Extremism in Serbia. 21st-Century Manifestations of an Historical Challenge.' *Europe-Asia Studies*, Available at: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09668136.2021.1880776>

<sup>19</sup> Kherigi, I., Ghribi, K., Chirchi, T. and Aloui, R. (2021). 'Tunisia: drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism in the light of state dynamics in MENA and the Balkans.' Available at: <https://h2020connekt.eu/publications/tunisia-macro-drivers-of-radicalisation-and-violent-extremism>

<sup>20</sup> Georgieva, L., Trajanovski, N., and Kambovski, V. (2021). 'North Macedonia: Macro-drivers of radicalisation and violent extremism.' Available at:

- **Political issues:** The lack of political representation in state institutions, and the political exclusion of ethnic or religious groups seem to be present both in the Balkans and the MENA region. States not offering political opportunity structures so that their citizens can raise their claims through institutions will be more likely to experience episodes of violent actions.<sup>21</sup>
- While no sufficient empirical evidence explains the relation between **culture** and radicalisation and VE, cultural policies contribute to the delineation of a collective identity that affects individuals' sense of belonging. Likewise, it can create identity schisms that feed an alienation and exclusion that could presumably lead to engage in VE. In general, **a considerable level of neglect is identified in P/CVE agendas regarding cultural aspects or leisure opportunities. The countries studied reveal rates of performative masculinity that explain the adoption of violent behaviour.**<sup>22</sup>

FIGURE 2. Constellation of interactions among drivers



Source: Own production

<sup>21</sup> Torrekens, C., and de Le Vingne, D. (2020). *Op. Cit*

<sup>22</sup> Chirchi, T., and Jrad, E. (2021). *Op. Cit.*

### 2.3. STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REGIONAL CHALLENGES

- **Hierarchisation of institutions** in the management of the P/CVE and the **lack of inter-institutional communication highlight the need for greater coordination and exchange of information between the CSOs and the State.**
- State security-related bodies dominate the states' approach to P/CVE.
- The level of participation of **CSOs shows a much more restricted performance in the MENA region than in the Balkans.**
- The **production of knowledge shows a bias towards the state's maintenance of the monopoly of information.**
- **Rigidity and harshness of anti-terrorist legislation** ends up legitimising the perpetration of human rights violations in the name of the fight against terrorism. Moreover, the lack of an official definition allows for an instrumentalisation of anti-terrorism legislation to silence any dissidence confronting the government's view.<sup>23</sup>
- Particularly in the MENA region, political instability is **seen as an obstacle for a coherent and unified approach to P/CVE** but also as a structural element favouring radicalisation processes.
- While the lack of domestic funding for P/CVE is a challenge, the engagement of international organisations as donors might eventually constitute an additional burden, limiting CSOs activity to the agendas imposed by their **international donors**, oblivious to the real needs of the field.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Mhadeen, B., Aisha, B. F., and Jadranka, Š. C. (2020). 'Jordan: Country report on national approaches to extremism.' Available at: <https://h2020connekt.eu/publications/jordan-country-report-on-national-approaches-to-extremism>

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

03

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS TO TACKLE STRUCTURAL AND INSTITUTIONAL REGIONAL CHALLENGES

TO NATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS

TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

On legislation and institutional understanding of the phenomenon

Move **away from hard security approaches** to more **comprehensive approaches** that address the root causes of radicalisation and VE.

**Set up P/CVE strategies and incorporate/update a National Plan.**

Set up **reviewing mechanisms** of existing strategies and update them according to changing needs and contexts.

Incentivise and support countries to align their **strategies** with **international standards**.

Urge states **not to instrumentalise the implementation of anti-terrorism law** to **curtail civil and political rights** and restrict the participation of social movements and protests.

Formulate **trainings toolkits** directed to the **media** urging a change in the discourse on communities "at risk" to **avoid stigmatisation** of certain communities under the spotlight.

On institutional hierarchies and inter-sectorial cooperation

Provide **mechanisms for information-sharing** among law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies.

Encourage **CSOs participation** in P/CVE programming at local, regional and national levels.

Reinforce **regional and sub-regional cooperation** and **exchange of best practices** in P/CVE issues.

Intensify **cross-regional contacts** and **exchanges** among **local authorities** regarding urban security and P/CVE.

Promote the **contact** between **EU and MENA and Balkans CSOs** to coordinate and exchange good practices in the field of prevention.

On political instability and funding

Design programmes **beyond the scope** of limited **governmental mandates**, particularly those devoted to prevention envisaging a long-term perspective.

Implement **independent evaluation mechanisms** to monitor the results of policies, strategies, and programmes on P/CVE.

Create specific, stable, and sustained funding lines for P/CVE programmes.

Ensure there are no obstacles imposed on CSOs to receive **more stable funding streams** and make sure **local partners define the agenda**.

Support the creation of a **multi-stakeholders monitoring entity** to ensure that funds and resources earmarked for C/PVE, or policies are not used to build political, religious, or ethnic allegiances.

On international cooperation and donors' agenda

Promote **regional and cross-regional platforms** for coordination and exchange regarding VE.

**Coordinate donors' engagement** to avoid duplication and assist national governments to put in place mechanisms for mapping P/CVE initiatives.

**Promote and fund research and actions** that **engage local national stakeholders** to address relevant concerns and challenges according to the **specific local contexts**.



On knowledge production

Facilitate **access to data, ease restrictions**, and **provide incentives** and **space** for researchers and CSOs to engage in formulating and assessing P/CVE policies and programmes.

Ensure that **communication channels** remain **open** between **researchers** and **decision-makers** to translate research into policies.

Facilitate the **exchange of information** and establish clear **guidelines** and **communication protocols** between different stakeholders.

Encourage **knowledge production** based on **empirical research** and relevant data collected on the field to better understand radicalisation and VE.

Promote a “**de-Eurocentrisation**” of analysis and approaches regarding radicalisation and VE by **involving local non-EU researchers** from neighbouring regions.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO TACKLE THE DRIVERS OF RADICALISATION

TO NATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS

TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

Within the scope of religion as a driver

Draw up strategies that conceive religion **not only as a factor of radicalisation**, but also of **de-radicalisation** and **resilience**.

Enlarge the **networks of religious leaderships and institutions** and promote the interaction of state actors with an inclusive range of religious representatives.

Promote a **moderate confessional discourse** using existing acknowledged religious institutions and promote the **education of religious leaders** within the pillars of democracy, participation, human rights, tolerance, and respect.

Create **municipal, regional, and state councils** on **religious diversity** and use them as referents in legislative matters.

**Facilitate venues**, managed, or led by **women and young people**, where a **critical** and **constructive rereading** of **sacred texts** can be done.

Introduce **religion** and **spiritualities** in **education** from a **humanistic perspective** through concrete subjects that tackles history of religions and spiritual beliefs.

Urge academics and policymakers to **produce literature** that **looks away from Islam as the only susceptible religion when studying radicalisation processes**; and to pay equal attention to radical interpretations of other religious beliefs and ideologies.

Set up a **forum** to **amplify voices** and **messages** of **non-violent religious preachers, scholars and leaders**, and **support interfaith dialogues**.

Provide **funds** and **support trainings** for **civil servants** enabling them to understand and manage the different religious, spiritual, and philosophical traditions in different sectors (e.g., public administration, security, health, education, among others).

Promote **cooperation funds** aimed at improving social cohesion with the requirement that the partnership be made up of representatives of different denominations and communities, as well as ethnic, religious and gender minorities. Launch a call for annual awards on peaceful coexistence among diverse communities.

Within the scope of economic deprivation as a driver

Prioritise **economic development plans** in **marginalised areas**, creating supporting mechanisms to ensure youth access to inclusive education and labour market insertion.

Encourage **contextual research** to research the **correlations** between **economic deprivation** and **VE** at a **macro-level**.

Promote **partnerships** between **municipalities**, **CSOs** and the **public sector** to foster employment opportunities and increasing labour market participation.

Encourage **partnerships** between **higher education institutions** and **labour market** to ensure education is responding to market needs.

Provide youth with necessary **skills** and **trainings** to adapt to **new economies demands** (i.e., digital economy, green economy, social and solidarity economy).

Promote **youth** and **women entrepreneurship**.

Increase **mobility schemes** to **enhance employability** of MENA and Balkan youngsters.

Support **states service delivery capacity**.

Within the scope of territorial inequalities as a driver

Prioritise **economic development plans** and motivate economic **investments** at the **local level**.

Provide short-term social packages for needy populations where the state does not normally reach and COVID-19 has had greater consequences, to counteract the echo and prevent the broadening of the social base of insurgent groups that have taken advantage of its absence.

Reduce population segregation by providing with **equal opportunities** and **prestigious education centres** to **marginalised areas**.

Support the creation of **cooperation networks** among peripheral regions from the EU member states and its neighbouring countries in MENA and Balkans. For example, expand the **city/town twinning campaigns** among smaller municipalities from the EU and the MENA and Balkans.

Enhance **context – based** and **empirical research** to explore the correlations between urban policies and VE.

Within the scope of transnational dynamics as a driver

Adopt a **precise** and **agreed definition of terrorism** and related notions.

Draft specific **legislation** on **FTFs management**.

Offer **training** to **frontline professionals** on the challenges posed by the return of FTFs.

Increase budget spending for the **creation** and **sustainability** of **rehabilitation programs** for FTFs returnees and their families.

Promote **research** on **radicalisation processes** in the **diaspora** and their link to national communities.

Extrapolate the implementation of the **figure** of the **coordinator of returnees** throughout Europe.

Enhance **interregional cooperation** and **legislative homogenisation** regarding the **repatriation of FTFs**.

Assist states in **identifying, sharing, and implementing best practices** in dealing with returning FTFs and their families.

Provide support to states in the **creation** of **criminal procedural law mechanisms** that respond to the **challenges of the FTFs phenomenon**.

Within the scope of digital socialisation as a driver

**Map digital inequalities** and **ensure digital literacy** to every population in need.

Provide schools with **computer equipment** and **facilitate access** to **social networks** from supervised learning to strengthen resilience against radical narratives.

Develop a clear **definition** of **online illegal hate speech** based on **consultations** with stakeholders and experts.

Enable **legal prosecution** of **online illegal speech**, based on the agreed definition of this type of speech.

Draw up a **strategy to identify the target audience** to which to direct the efforts of P/CVE in the digital sphere and relevant instruments for youth.

Promote **digital instruction on risks and advantages** of the net to all **religious leaders** aiming to advocate for a moderate discourse.

Develop **homogenised instruments** to measure the attractiveness of the messages and the impact and effectiveness of **online alternative narrative campaigns**.

Address the **shortcomings of the Balkans** in relation to their **lack of a cybersecurity structure** by **supporting knowledge and technology transfers**.

Support **governments** in their **digital transition** and efforts to promote digital literacy and inclusion, particularly among **vulnerable communities**.

Support **trainings on narratives, counter narratives, and assertive communication** aimed at frontline partitioners and professionals in the public sector, especially those who have a clear **impact on local communities** (i.e., politicians, journalists, teachers, religious leaders, health personnel...).

Within the scope of socio-political issues (ideas and grievances) as a driver

Provide **fair and equitable social protection services**, such as health, education, culture, social services, etc. necessary to live a decent life.

Provide legal and **financial support to associations and organisations** made up of **women and young people**.

Improve **transparency and accountability** from **state institutions** to regain trust from citizenship towards public administration and political actors.

Promote **local, regional, and national youth councils** to ensure **youth proactive engagement in decision-making** processes.

Support **youth initiatives** aimed at promoting a **culture of dialogue and peace**, particularly among the most vulnerable to violence and VE.

Strengthen the promotion of good **governance mechanisms** and **respect for rule of law** in EU's neighbourhood and provide **sustained funds** for this aim.

Promote **research on the impact of EU's foreign policies** (and EU's member states foreign policies) on the Balkans and the MENA region.

Promote **research on cross-perceptions** and mutual images as a way to assess the state of interculturality between the EU and its neighbourhood.

Promote the **creation of partnerships** between **states** and women and **youth associations** in terms of **political empowerment**.

Within the scope of education, culture and leisure opportunities as a driver

**Commit to the representation of all cultures** in the public sphere and in the **legal system**.

Support **empirical research** to explore to which extent youth's **lack of access to cultural and artistic opportunities** and **freedom of expression** impacts its **vulnerability** to violent radicalisation.

Expand European **curricular internship programmes** with ENP new partner universities.

Urge states to **separate cultural heritage from political and identity-based agendas**, promoting cultural heritage as a shared component of collective identity.

Plan **cultural programmes** and **spaces for leisure activities** to channel **youth energy** into **positive activism** and **civic engagement**.

Reinforce the **role of education** as an essential tool to promote **critical thinking**.

Encourage education institutions to **enhance youth creativity** and **resilience** and include **emotional education** to guarantee respect to the **right of belonging and search of identity**.

Educate and promote **gender equality** as a way to **de-articulate** the potential of **toxic masculinities**.

Recognize the **legitimacy** of **ethnic, religious and/or ideological minorities**, in order to promote a general **sense of belonging**.

Design **collective healing events and acts of reconciliation/recognition** to address **historical grievances**, especially in those countries facing a post-conflict scenario.

Promote research and support action in preventing and countering rapidly expanding extremist ideas on gender, sexuality and identity that intertwine with both religious or political extremist currents both in online and offline spheres.



---

**D8.1**

Policy Brief on Macro-Level Drivers of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism in MENA and Balkans.

This publication is part of the WP8 of the project, led by Universitat Rovira i Virgili (URV)